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Introduction: 
In the 2017 season, the Houston Astros used a technology that deciphered the signs of the 
opponent’s team catcher and would inform the Houston Astros hitter what pitch would be thrown 
by the pitcher. It is difficult to determine the exact benefits that the Houston Astros gained from 
this technology. However, the Houston Astros were the 2017 World Series Champions, the team 
had the lowest number of strikeouts, and the highest team batting average, on base percentage, 
slugging percentage, and on base plus slugging percentage for any team in the 2017 season 
(ESPN, n.d.). The use of the technology and these team statistics and World Series championship 
could be correlated in a spurious relationship, but that is not likely to be the situation. It is more 
likely that the technology gave the Houston Astros a significant advantage that translated into 
better offensive performance, more wins, and a World Series championship.  
The purpose of this paper is to provide an economic analysis for why the Houston Astros 
or any team would use what is considered an ​illegal technology​ to gain an advantage and win 
baseball games. Due to the existence of technology, baseball is no longer a game that is won 
strictly on the basis of talent, but it is a game that is won on the basis of talent and technology 
(whether it be legal or illegal). The Houston Astros acted rationally in the team’s pursuit of its 
own self-interest to win the 2017 World Series. The existence and relevance of bounded 
rationality dictate that the Houston Astros did not know the exact probability of detection, 
victory, or penalty. However, the team understood the benefits associated with victory were 
greater than the costs associated with being caught. Through Major League Baseball (MLB) 
limiting fines to $5 million, the league has created a system of perverse incentives for teams to 
use illegal technology. In the 2017 season, the average salary for a MLB player was $4.45 
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million (​Gough​, 2019). For a little more than the cost of the average player, the Houston Astros 
were willing to use an illegal technology to distort the game of baseball for the team’s advantage.  
Due to the existence of illegal technology, MLB teams are (or will be) stuck in a 
prisoner’s dilemma. Every team now has a choice about whether or not to use illegal technology 
in a game. If both teams do not use the illegal technology in a game, then that is the optimal 
solution. However, if one team uses the illegal technology in a game, and the other team does not 
use the illegal technology, then the team that uses the technology has a clear advantage. As a 
result, both teams have a dominant strategy to use the technology and this results in a Nash 
sub-optimal equilibrium. Both baseball teams would then use the illegal technology and the 
benefits of the technology for one team would nullify the benefits that the other team would 
receive. Baseball teams will be caught in this suboptimal equilibrium because of the perverse 
incentives in MLB and the inability or even the unwillingness of the league to properly deter this 
strategy. While cooperation is necessary among teams to escape this prisoner’s dilemma, MLB 
must remove the cap that is placed on fines in order to further deter use of illegal technology. 
Additionally, MLB must allow for the system by which catchers indicate pitches to 
evolve. With the existence of illegal technology, the defense of baseball teams has become 
irrational. If the defense of a baseball team wants to prevent the other team from scoring runs, 
then the team would logically take actions to prevent the opposing team from doing so. The 
preferences of the defense are as follows: (1) indicate signs to the pitcher without the opposing 
team knowing or (2) indicate signs to the pitcher with the opposing team knowing. Currently, 
when the catcher indicates signs to the pitcher, the opposing team is able to use the technology to 
decipher those signs. The status quo bias provides a useful explanation for why teams have not 
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made more of an effort to change this method of communication. MLB must alter the behavior 
of the defense, so the defense is willing to choose a strategy to indicate signs to the pitcher 
without the opposing team knowing what pitch will be thrown. MLB teams may also have not 
adopted innovations that are capable of “outsmarting” the technology. The book ​Nudge​ by 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein offers useful and creative advice on how MLB could change 
the behaviors of teams and players. 
In this paper, the first section is a literature review that is broken into three sections: 
psychology background, economics background, and sports history background. The second 
section explains the structure and economic model for baseball in the 20th century without the 
use of technology. The third section explains the structure and economic model for baseball in 
the 21st century with the use of technology. The fourth section explains the economics of 
penalties in MLB, and the cost-benefit analysis that teams do to understand whether or not they 
should use illegal technology. The fifth section applies the economics of penalties and 
cost-benefit analysis to explain the behavior of the Houston Astros in the 2017 season. The sixth 
section explains the prisoner’s dilemma that is created because of the use of illegal technology in 
MLB. The seventh section explains how MLB teams can escape the prisoner’s dilemma to 
restore uncertainty of outcome to games.  
 
I. Literature Review 
This paper provides an economic and interdisciplinary perspective on the Houston Astros 
Cheating Scandal. As a result, there are three subsections to the literature review. The first 
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section provides a psychology background, second section provides an economics background, 
and third section provides a sports history background. 
A. Psychology Background 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) explain three heuristics (representativeness, availability, 
and anchoring) that impact how humans make decisions and lead to common biases. The 
representative heuristic is “employed to when people are asked to judge the probability that an 
object or event A belongs to class or process B” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1131). As a 
result, this heuristic causes humans to have “insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes” 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1124) and “insensitivity to predictability”, which impacts how 
predictions are made based on information that is not correctly interpreted. The availability 
heuristic is “employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the 
plausibility of a particular development” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1131). In 
decision-making, humans have difficulty with “retrievability of instances” and “imaginability”, 
which causes us to focus on rare events, rather than common events. (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974, 1127). The anchoring heuristic is “employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value 
is available” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1131). Through these heuristics and others that 
researchers have described, humans are fallible in decision-making and our mental processes 
lead us to make decisions that have systematic errors and are not viewed as “rational”. 
 
B. Economics Background 
Rationality is defined as pursuing an objective in the best and least cost way. 
Furthermore, rationality is when an individual has a set of preferences that are ranked, they 
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always adopt, and make choices based on. Individuals are able to access perfect information and 
perfect knowledge in order to make the best decisions. However, economist Herbert Simon 
articulated that individuals are not capable of behaving in this “rational” way. Due to the 
impossibility of processing all information and knowledge, humans have a limited ability to be 
“rational.” Simon defined the concept “bounded rationality” to describe decision-making with 
limited information and knowledge, and the reliance of individuals on our own heuristics and 
shortcuts. Bounded rationality is closer to describing how humans actually make decisions 
compared to rationality and the belief that humans have all of the abilities and resources to make 
a rational decision.  
William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser (1988) identified the existence of the status 
quo bias and its pervasive impact in the tendency of people to remain with the status quo under 
uncertainty. The authors argued that the status quo bias occurs not because of rational choice 
theory, but due to the psychology of humans. “The stronger the individual’s previous 
commitment to the status quo, the stronger the anchoring effect” (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1988, 41). As a result, the status quo bias forces people to be in a sub-optimal position without 
them even realizing that they are acting against their own self-interest. 
In a prisoner’s dilemma, there are at least two players who have at least two strategies to 
choose between that have either optimal payoffs or sub-optimal payoffs. The players will always 
choose the dominant strategy that results in sub-optimal payoffs for both of them. In any 
prisoner’s dilemma, the suboptimal outcomes are always inferior to the optimal outcomes. The 
Nash Equilibria occurs when both players choose their dominant strategies that results in a 
suboptimal equilibrium.  
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Kjetil K. Haugen (2004) identified the existence of the prisoner’s dilemma with doping in 
cycling. Players have a choice about whether or not to use performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs). 
However, players are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma about whether or not to use PEDs, even if 
they are uncertain about the effects and advantages of the drugs (this is ignoring the moral 
opinions of some players). J.C. Bradbury (2007) wrote about the existence of the prisoner’s 
dilemma in baseball with PEDs. Bradbury applied the prisoner’s dilemma to understand the 
incentives of players and why they would use them to potentially benefit in the labor market. 
Baseball Hall of Fame Pitcher Bob Gibson once stated “I’m happy they [PEDs] weren’t available 
(when he played), because if I knew somebody else was doing it and appeared to be getting an 
edge, I think I would have been tempted.” Despite being one of the greatest pitchers, Bob Gibson 
would have been willing to use PEDs if it meant that he could potentially match the advantages 
that his opponent gained from their use of PEDs. Therefore, both Bob Gibson and his opponent 
would have been caught in a prisoner’s dilemma of choosing the dominant strategy to use PEDs 
and receive suboptimal payoffs instead of choosing to not use PEDs and receive optimal payoffs.  
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (1998) provide a framework for how economists can consider 
psychological implications in the field of law and economics. The authors argue that individuals 
act with bounded rationality because ​“​bounded rationality as it relates to judgement behavior will 
come into play whenever actors in the legal system are called upon to assess the probability of an 
uncertain event” (Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 1998, 1480). Due to humans not being perfect 
calculators, they “judge the likelihood of uncertain events (such as getting caught for a crime) by 
how available such instances are to the mind, and this may depend on factors unrelated to the 
actual probability of the event.” (Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler, 1998, 1538). 
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Thaler and Sunstein (2003) argue that libertarian paternalism should be adopted in certain 
cases to promote the welfare of individuals. A libertarian is an individual who generally believes 
in less authoritative structure and more freedom for individuals to make decisions. Opposite to a 
libertarian is a paternalist, who generally believes in a more authoritative structure and less 
freedom for individuals to make decisions with an authoritative body “coercing” people to make 
the ideal choices. Libertarian Paternalism is when an authoritative body structures choices to lead 
people to the ideal choice, but there is no coercion, and individuals can opt out. Thaler and 
Sunstein outline the three approaches that libertarian paternalists could use including (1) “the 
approach that the majority would choose if explicit choices were required and revealed”; (2) “the 
approach that would force people to make their choices explicit”; and (3) “the approach 
minimizes the number of opt-outs” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, 178-179). 
In the book ​Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness​ by 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2009), the authors define a choice mechanism they call 
“nudge” that is capable of changing people’s behaviors from an individual being “irrational” to 
an individual being “rational”. A nudge is able to change people’s behavior because a choice 
architect changes the default choice to be the optimal choice that allows people to act in their 
self-interest. Choice architects are individuals who design the systems or methods through which 
people make choices. Choice architects would use a nudge so that the default choice is now the 
best decision that the individual would have made. The authors argue that nudge works because 
we are human and not “Homo-Economicus”.  Our psychological biases and inconsistencies 
cause our decision-making to sometimes be flawed and for us to make irrational choices. Nudge 
changes the default choice so that the choice is rational and is part of the status quo. Thaler and 
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Sunstein argue that when humans make choices, they are willing to stick with the default because 
of “inertia” and the “status quo bias” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009, 85). People struggle to change 
from the default because it takes some amount of effort to change their behavior.  
Thaler and Sunstein argue that choice architects should consider the following principles 
when structuring choices: “incentives, understand mappings, defaults, give feedback, expect 
error, and structure complex choices” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009, 102). Choice architects must 
understand the incentives that are related to the choices that individuals have to make. If a 
consumer is clearly informed about the financial costs of a choice, then they would be willing to 
change their behavior. For example, Thaler and Sunstein hypothesize that a thermostat that 
informs the individual of the cost of raising their heat by a few degrees might be enough to get 
them to keep the temperature low and their electricity costs down (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009, 
101). Thaler and Sunstein argue that choice architects must understand that people should 
understand the connection between the choices and welfare they receive from that choice. “Call 
this relation between choice and welfare a mapping” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009, 94) and “Often 
people have a problem in mapping products into money” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009, 95). Thaler 
and Sunstein argue that mapping could be improved through a system called “RECAP: Record, 
Evaluate, and Compare Alternative Prices” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009, 95). RECAP would force 
companies to report to the consumer all associated fees, charges, interest rates, and other costs 
associated with an item or service. The consumer is then able to receive this RECAP report from 
every company they wish to potentially buy a good or service from. The consumer can then 
compare all of these reports and better understand the costs of the decision that they have to 
make. Additionally, people are prone to make errors that could have big or costly impacts. For 
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example, Thaler and Sunstein explain how cars are filled with “nudges”, such as a light that 
informs the driver to turn their seatbelt on and a light that informs the driver that they need to 
change their oil or fill their gasoline (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009, 90). These nudges exist because 
we make errors, such as forgetting to put on our seatbelt or when we need our next oil change. 
Additionally, humans sometimes need feedback, so that they know they made a choice. Thaler 
and Sunstein provide the example that when people take a picture on a modern-day camera, there 
is still a click sound (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 92). The reason that cameras still click, despite 
no longer needing film, is because people might otherwise not know if they took a picture. The 
click prevents people from taking several photos. Thaler and Sunstein stress the importance of 
“structuring complex choices'', meaning that “As choices become more numerous...good choice 
architecture will provide structure, and structure will affect outcomes” (Thaler and Sunstein, 
2009, 97). For example, when an individual is at a new restaurant with an extremely large menu, 
they might have a difficult time making a choice. However, if the restaurant indicates which of 
their dishes are the best, then the decision making process is more structured and easy for the 
customer.  
In regards to the economics of sports, Simon Rottenberg (1956) wrote the first economics 
of sports paper on the game of baseball titled “The Baseball Players’ Labor Market.” Rottenberg 
identified the justification of the reserve clause to be: 
 “that the reserve rule is necessary to assure an equal distribution of playing talent among 
opposing teams; that a more or less equal distribution of talent is necessary if there is to 
be uncertainty of outcome; and that uncertainty of outcome is necessary if the consumer 
is to be willing to pay admission to the game” (Rottenberg, 1956, 246). 
 
This statement has become known as the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis because fans are 
only willing to pay money for a sports game if they are uncertain of the outcome. Despite the 
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reserve clause rules having changed since 1956 to only apply to the first six years of a player’s 
career, the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis is still valid. If a fan was certain about the outcome 
of every game, then there is little reason for them to watch. Fans receive utility from watching a 
game unfold and uncertainty generates more satisfaction when their preferred team wins. While 
there might be some fans who pay to receive utility from watching the game of baseball even if 
the outcome is certain, the casual or prospective fan who wants to see a competition will not pay 
to see a certain outcome. Every pitch, at-bat, and play are parts of the game of baseball that are 
uncertain, and must be uncertain for a competition with an uncertain outcome to occur. 
C. Sports Background 
The central goal of MLB is to ensure that there is competitive balance in the league. 
Competition between teams often leads to imbalances that need to be corrected, whether this be 
by teams innovating, MLB instituting a new policy, or MLB penalizing a team. Standard 
deviation of winning percentage is often considered to be a good measure of competitive 
balance. If the standard deviation of winning percentage is low and close to zero, then this 
indicates the league is balanced and the teams are close together in terms of competitiveness. If 
the standard deviation of winning percentage is high, then this indicates the league may not be 
balanced and the teams are not equal in terms of competitiveness. Figure 1 is a depiction of the 
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competitive balance in baseball between the years 1960 and 2020. 
 
Figure 1: (Source: Edwards 2019)  
Edwards (2020) recognizes that the peaks of standard deviation of team winning percentage are 
associated with expansion years when new teams entered the league (expansion teams are 
notorious for having a poor performance in the team’s first year). However, Edwards (2020) 
notes there is also a correlation between the rise in competitive balance at the turn of the century 
due to the use of PEDs. Edwards does not provide a clear reason for why competitive balance 
has drastically risen in the second half of the 2010s, but he speculates it is because of the 
existence of multiple “superteams” that have seasons with over 100 wins. 
MLB has seeked to ensure competitive balance in a top-down approach in various ways, 
such as reverse-order drafts, revenue sharing, and the reserve clause (Miceli 2019). MLB has 
also penalized players harmful behaviors that disrupt competitive balance. However, the 
penalties have a mixed history of effectively deterring harmful behavior.  
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MLB has been most successful at deterring players from gambling on baseball games. In 
the 1919 World Series, 8 Chicago White Sox players were accused of fixing the World Series for 
gambling bets. The 8 players were banned from MLB. No player ever gambled on a game of 
baseball again until Pete Rose. After it was discovered that Pete Rose had been gambling, he was 
banned from MLB. No player has since gambled on baseball. MLB gives tough penalties for 
players who gamble on baseball because when a baseball game is fixed, the outcome is no longer 
uncertain, and the teams are no longer fairly balanced.  
The penalties on PEDs have evolved over time because the original penalties were not an 
effective deterrent. PEDs disrupted competitive balance because the drugs gave an unequal 
advantage to players who used them. From the 1980s to the early 2010s, the use of PEDs was 
rampant in MLB. Despite MLB cracking down on the use of PEDs and suspending players in the 
mid-2000s, players continued to use PEDs. It was not until MLB significantly increased the 
penalties did players stop using PEDs. Even with increased penalties, players still are known to 
use PEDs, but it is no longer as common.  
Teams have also seeked to correct competitive imbalances. In a chapter of ​The Baseball 
Economist​ titled “Innovating to Win”, J.C. Bradbury (2007) outlines innovations pursued by 
MLB teams that led to that team winning games. Other teams then adopted that innovation in 
order to restore a competitive balance. The Oakland Athletics’ front office discovered that 
on-base percentage was undervalued on the free agency market. The Oakland Athletics were able 
to do this through using technology that could analyze the performance and salaries of players. 
The Oakland Athletics benefited from this discovery for several seasons before other teams 
started to adopt this innovation. Every MLB team soon developed a front office that is capable of 
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analyzing performance statistics and what players should be paid. Bradbury (2007, 129) 
explained that a major innovation in baseball was the decision of the Brooklyn Dodgers General 
Manager Branch Rickey to sign Jackie Robinson and desegregate MLB. Prior to 1947, African 
American baseball players were blocked from playing in MLB because of racism, and no team 
would hire African American players. After Jackie Robinson’s successful rookie year, other 
teams began to sign African American players.  
Thaler and Sunstein (2004) discuss the existence of bounded rationality and heuristics in 
MLB. The thesis of their book review of ​Moneyball​ is that Billy Beane and Oakland Athletics 
acted rationally in a market, whereby many teams were acting irrationally and overpaying 
players. Thaler and Sunstein argue that the use of technology as pioneered by the Oakland 
Athletics corrected the inaccuracies of heuristics and biases that plagued baseball. For example, 
MLB scouts have always relied on the representativeness heuristic to understand the traits and 
characteristics of a good baseball player, but Billy Beane used statistics instead of the scout’s 
biases to understand which players were good (Thaler and Sunstein, 2004, 1396-1397). 
Additionally, the technology and statistics that the Oakland Athletics used were around for many 
years, but teams had relied on their previous methods and were not willing to innovate despite it 
being rational to do so (Thaler and Sunstein, 2004, 1398).  
The innovation of technology in MLB has been widely spread. However, MLB has 
always been wary of the idea that teams may use technology to steal information from other 
teams. The first occurrence of an illegal use of technology under MLB rules occurred when Chris 
Correa, an executive for the St. Louis Cardinals, hacked into the “Houston Astros’ email system 
and analytical scouting database in 2013 and 2014” (Manfred, 2017, 1). The use of technology 
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imposes a difficulty for MLB to understand how much harm is done by a team that acts illegally. 
Commissioner Robert Manfred noted this challenge by stating: “The type of potential 
competitive harm the Astros suffered as a result of Mr. Correa’s conduct is not amenable to 
precise quantification” (Manfred, 2017, 2). Commissioner Manfred penalized the St. Louis 
Cardinals by banning Chris Correa, giving the top two draft picks of the St. Louis Cardinals in 
the 2017 draft to the Astros, and fining the St. Louis Cardinals $2,000,000 (Manfred, 2017, 3). 
On January 13, 2020 MLB Commissioner Rob Manfred released a statement regarding 
the Houston Astros scandal. A section of the report was dedicated to the factual findings of 
MLB’s investigation. At the start of the 2017 season, the Houston Astros devised a system, 
whereby players or team personnel would watch live footage of the game, and then they would 
be able to inform the coaches through Apple watches or the players on the field through signs 
(Manfred, 2020, 1-2). However, the Houston Astros players believed this method was 
ineffective. The commissioner's report states that the method changed about two months into the 
season. The new method was a coordination between players, low-level front office employees, 
and Alex Cora, who was the bench coach of the Houston Astros. An individual (either a player 
or baseball operations employee) would watch the game in the dugout and would determine what 
pitch the pitcher was going to throw (Manfred, 2020, 2). After interpreting the catcher’s sign, the 
individual would bang a trash can depending on the type of pitch (Manfred, 2020, 2). Often, a 
bang would mean that a non-fastball or “offspeed” pitch would be thrown. In the commissioner’s 
report, Rob Manfred states that he was not capable of determining whether or not the system was 
effective for hitters and the outcomes of at-bats (Manfred, 2020, 5). Additionally, the report 
states that some players believed the method was ineffective and a “distraction.”  
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However, Rob Manfred stated that this use of technology was not accepted under MLB’s 
rules. Under the rules and constitution that govern MLB, Commissioner Rob Manfred financially 
punished the Houston Astros organization as severely as possible. “The Club will pay to my 
office a fine of $5 million, which is the highest allowable fine under the Major League 
Constitution” (Manfred, 2020, 8). Additionally, the Astros lost their first and second round draft 
picks for the 2020 and 2021 drafts. General Manager Jeff Lunhow and Manager AJ Hinch were 
suspended for one year. No players were penalized or mentioned in the commissioner's report 
(except Carlos Beltran who has since retired and was said to have a major role in changing the 
method).  
II. The Structure and Economic Model of Baseball in the 20th century 
In this section, the economic model of baseball in the 20th century is explained. I do not 
take credit for developing this model. The model is explained in Miceli (2019). It is important to 
understand the differences between baseball in the 20th century and the 21st century in order to 
explain the harm of the cheating by the Houston Astros. The most important difference is that 
teams have significantly developed a front office that conducts analysis using technology in the 
21st century. Prior to explaining the structure and economic model of baseball in the 20th 
century, I discuss the similarities between baseball in the 20th and 21st century that are pertinent 
to this paper. 
II.I Similarities Between Baseball in the 20th and 21st Century 
Regardless of the century, baseball has always been a sport that involves interdependence 
between teams and competitors. Any sport requires some level of interdependence between 
teams or competitors in order for the sport to exist. In MLB, teams cooperate to set a schedule of 
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games and agree on rules. The cooperation that exists between teams and competitors allows for 
games or competitions to occur. A pitcher throwing the pitch to the batter is the essential 
interdependence that allows a baseball game to occur. The performance of a baseball team was 
rooted in the ability of players on a team to cooperate with one another. The talent of the defense 
on a team was necessary to prevent runs and the talent of the offense on a team was necessary to 
score runs.  
In baseball, there is an interdependence between the pitcher, catcher, and coaches 
regarding communication and choosing which pitches are thrown.  Often, a coach on the bench 
signals a sign to the catcher about what pitch should be thrown. The catcher then communicates 
the recommended pitch to the pitcher. The pitcher then communicates with a head nod indicating 
“yes” to that pitch, or a head shake indicating “no” to that pitch. There are three reasons for this 
method of communication: (1) coaches are able to control an aspect of the game, (2) catchers, 
coaches, and pitchers have the most information about the weaknesses of hitters on the opposing 
team, and (3) is a safety mechanism for the catcher to know what pitch the pitcher would throw. 
This method of communication is effective in preventing the other team from knowing what 
pitch will be thrown, except when the offensive team has a player on second base. When a player 
is on second base, they are able to see the sign that the catcher indicates to the pitcher, and they 
are able to inform the hitter what pitch will be thrown. The hitter can then use this information to 
his benefit to know how to swing at the pitch.  
The method of communication that the defense uses illustrates one of the most essential 
parts of baseball: asymmetric information. Typically, markets need symmetric information in 
order for the market to function properly. Baseball deviates from the need for symmetric 
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information because baseball is a non-market activity and it is essential that the pitcher knows 
the pitch they should throw and the batter does not know what pitch will be thrown. If the hitter 
knew which would be thrown, then they would have a clear advantage and be able to use that 
information to get on base. Baseball teams should not cooperate and allow symmetric 
information because the outcome of the game would be “fixed” and no longer uncertain. The 
utility of the fans is maximized when a game is uncertain. Fans are willing to pay for an 
uncertain game because the games are competitive and not “rigged”. Asymmetric information 
causes fans to be most engaged in watching a baseball game and be willing to pay to attend the 
games. MLB and teams are rational to ensure that asymmetric information is an integral part of 
games in order to attract fans to watch.  
A valid counter-argument is that there have been pitchers who had a “signature pitch” 
that they always threw, and the hitter was aware and still unable to get on base. Phil Niekro 
threw a knuckleball, Gaylord Perry threw a spitball, and Mariano Rivera threw a cutter, and they 
were dominant pitchers. However, not every pitcher is dominant. As a general principle, the 
hitter should not know what pitch the pitcher will throw. This principle helps better guarantee 
that the outcome of an at-bat is uncertain. 
 
II. The Structure and Economic Model of Baseball in the 20th Century 
In the 20th century, baseball teams were built to either maximize profit, maximize wins, 
or maximize a mix of profit and wins. Baseball teams were able to maximize profit and/or wins 
on the basis of player’s talent. Therefore, teams with the most talent would likely have the most 
fans and wins. This assertion might be simplistic, but it is valid. In 1927, the New York Yankees 
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were the most talented team, and the team included seven future hall of famers and had the 
highest winning percentage in baseball and won the World Series. 
The economic model for baseball in the 20th century defines x as talent, WP as winning 
percentage, and winning percentage as a function of talent. The talent was also paid a wage, that 
is defined as w. On the business side of sports, total revenue was a function of talent. The more 
talent that a team had, the higher the attendance. In the 1927 season, the New York Yankees had 
the highest attendance of any team (Baseball Reference, n.d.). Therefore, the function for a win 
maximizing team is as follows: 
TR(WP(x))-wx 
Baseball teams deal with a budget constraint, so the function more realistically would be: 
TR(WP(x))-wx ≥ 0 
While it is nice to think that every owner and team seeks to maximize winning percentage, that is 
not realistic. There were likely owners who owned a baseball team for the purpose of earning 
money. These baseball teams would seek to maximize profit and would have the typical profit 
function of a firm: 
π=P(Q)Q-C(Q) 
Q=the quantity of goods sold (tickets) 
P(Q)=the price of the ticket 
C(Q)=the labor, material, and capital costs associated with the baseball team 
In order to make the model more realistic, teams were likely a combination of 
win-maximizers and profit-maximizers. In 1927, the New York Yankees likely maximized the 
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number of wins based on talent, but also maximized profit. The equation for a team that 
maximizes wins and profit is as follows: 
π=TR(Q, WP(x))-C(Q)-wx 
It is important to note the specialization of labor structure of a MLB team for a majority 
of the 20th century. The front office labor in baseball was distinctly focused on the business-side 
of baseball. The front office would hire and trade players, determine business strategies to earn 
money, and work with other teams to create a schedule among other office duties. The players 
and coaches were distinctly focused on winning baseball games. There was a clear separation 
between the duties and responsibilities of the players and the front office (Sometimes the 
manager of the team was also the general manager of the team). The idea that a person in the 
front office would interact and give advice to a player on how to hit a baseball was comedic. In 
an episode of “Seinfeld”, George Costanza gives advice to New York Yankees players Derek 
Jeter and Bernie Williams about how to hit a baseball. The joke had a hidden truth: the people in 
the front office were intelligent on the business-side, but the idea that they could somehow help 
the players on the field win baseball games was unheard of and laughable. 
III. The Structure and Model of Baseball in the 21st Century 
The rules that governed a game of baseball in the 21st century were not extremely 
different from the rules that governed the game of baseball for the second half of the 20th 
century. The largest distinction between the 21st century and the 20th century was the use of 
technology in the front office to help teams win. “Moneyball” ushered in an era of baseball, 
whereby teams would hire front office staff to analyze data and use technology to improve the 
team. The Oakland Athletics front office staff were doing their jobs to sign players, which had 
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always been the role of the front office within the specialization of labor for a baseball team. 
Technology only allowed the front office to do their jobs more rationally, productively, and 
efficiently.  
In MLB in the 21st century, it is common knowledge that all teams have a front office 
staff that analyzes the performance of players. With technology, front offices attempt to break 
baseball down into a game of patterns. For example, a front office could analyze the strike zone 
for a hitter, and be able to determine the locations of pitches that hitters are least likely to make 
contact. For the purposes of this example, the hitter is New York Yankees hitter Aaron Judge and 
the opposing team is the Boston Red Sox. Figure 2 depicts the strike zone for Aaron Judge, and 
various statistics about his performance within each part of the strike zone. The Boston Red Sox 
front office would inform the pitchers, coaches, and catchers that Aaron Judge is most likely to 
whiff or strikeout when a pitch is thrown inside, and is most likely to make contact when the 
pitch is thrown high and outside.  
 
Figure 2: Aaron Judge Strike Zone Source: (Baseball Savant, n.d.) 
 
Likewise, the New York Yankees front office could use this information to inform Aaron Judge 
that he receives a large number of pitches low and inside, and he also is most likely to strike out 
and whiff when a pitch is thrown inside. As a result, Aaron Judge would be able to practice 
hitting pitches in these areas in order to improve his performance. Front offices have been able to 
determine the exit velocity, launch angle, and locations of the pitches that players hit. Similarly, 
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front office staff have been able to determine for pitchers what their best pitches are, locations of 
pitches, and other important information.  
The most important development of the structure of a baseball team in the 21st century is 
that there is now an interdependence between the information that the front office is able to 
acquire, and the performance of players on the field. Every baseball team has a front office with 
a analytics department that is composed of statisticians, economists, computer programmers, and 
physicists who seek to acquire this information. At this time, it is nearly impossible to determine 
the exact impact that an analytics department has on the performance of players because of 
private information that only the teams are able to access. It can be assumed that the benefits of 
an analytics department for a team are greater than the costs of the department, and therefore 
justifies the employment of these individuals.  
In baseball, there are still win-maximizing teams, profit-maximizing teams, and a 
combination of win-maximizing and profit-maximizing teams. Due to the importance of 
technology in the game of baseball, technology must be added to the economic model of 
baseball. Teams no longer depend on just talent to win baseball games, but also depend on the 
benefits that technology provides for the players. Winning percentage has become a function of 
talent and technology, and total revenue is a function of winning percentage. Talent is still paid a 
fixed wage, and there is a fixed cost associated with technology (labor, cost of technology). The 
equation for total revenue of a win-maximizing and profit-maximizing team is as follows: 
TR(WP(x, t))-wx-st 
s=cost associated with technology 
t=level of technology 
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The profit equation for a win-maximizing and profit-maximizing team is as follows: 
π=TR(Q, WP(x,t))-C(Q)-wx-st 
 
The technology of baseball teams that I have written about so far is considered the ​legal 
technology​ that baseball teams are allowed to use. For the purposes of this paper, ​Legal 
technology​ is defined as the technology that teams use off the field to analyze performance of 
players.  Information that is acquired through ​legal technology​ can be used to inform the players 
and improve the performance of the players. In MLB there is also ​illegal technology​. For the 
purposes of this paper, ​on-field illegal technology ​is defined as technology that is used on the 
field during a game and ​off-field illegal technology ​is defined as technology that is used to 
acquire information from the technology of other teams. ​On-field illegal technology​ tampers with 
the competitive nature of a baseball game that is based on human talent and capabilities and is 
considered illegal on the league level. ​Off-field illegal technology ​is a much more serious offense 
and is considered illegal on the league level and “society level” (involves law enforcement, such 
as the FBI). 
MLB has to make policy decisions about which actions are legal or acceptable and which 
actions are illegal or unacceptable. Steroids, betting on games, and throwing spitballs are actions 
that MLB has declared to be illegal under the league’s rules. However, a runner on second 
stealing signs, “Moneyball” technology, and defense using hidden ball tricks to tag runners out 
are all considered legal and acceptable actions. Under MLB’s current rules, ​on-field illegal 
technology​ and ​off-field illegal technology​ are not allowed and punished. However, MLB has not 
been capable of deterring teams from using illegal technology. MLB must determine rules about 
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what types of sign stealing are legal and what types are illegal. Sign stealing has always been a 
gray area of baseball’s rules, but the use of illegal technology has only revealed the problems 
that sign stealing can cause.  
There is a history of teams in the 2010s using illegal technology as explained in the 
background section. The actions of the Houston Astros in the 2017 season would be considered 
use of ​on-field illegal technology​ and the actions of the St. Louis Cardinals would be considered 
use of ​off-field illegal technology.  
The equations for the baseball teams in the 21st century need to be modified to include 
the existence of illegal technology. The total revenue function for a win-maximizing team is as 
follows: 
TR(WP(x, t, b))-wx-st-p(b)f 
b=illegal technology 
p(b)=probability that illegal technology (b) results in detection 
f=fine that would be imposed on team for using illegal technology  
The profit function for a win-maximizing and profit-maximizing team is as follows:  
TR(Q, WP(x, t, b))-C(Q)Q-wx-st-p(b)f 
It is important to note that teams can choose to have b be equal to 0, meaning that they do not use 
any illegal technology. However, teams do use illegal technology and there are substantial fines 
that are associated with the technology because of the harm created by that technology. 
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IV. Economics of Penalties in MLB 
The purpose of this section is to describe the economics of penalties in MLB. This 
section is set up in two subsections. The first subsection describes how penalties impact the 
behavior of teams and players. The second subsection describes how violations are enforced.  
A. How Penalties Impact Behavior of Players and Teams 
Players and teams have the choice to play a game of baseball the “right way” (i.e., no 
rules violations, such as none of the following: gambling, PEDs, illegal technology, etc) or the 
“wrong way” (i.e., breaking rules such as the following:, gambling, PEDs, illegal technology, 
etc). MLB has rules in place to deter the behavior of playing baseball the “wrong way”. Based on 
the assumption that teams and players act rationally, players and teams will make decisions if the 
benefits are greater than the costs. Players and teams will choose to violate rules if the benefits of 
the violation are greater than the costs of the violation. A player or team will not make a 
decision, whereby the costs of the violation are greater than the benefits of the violation.  
Bounded rationality is used for choices about whether or not to commit a violation. 
Players and teams do not perfectly know the exact harm, benefit, or violation that will be 
imposed. As Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (2004) observed, people will make judgments that are 
based on recent events and will use bounded rationality to determine whether or not they should 
commit a crime when there is uncertainty about their chances of being caught. Players and teams 
are not perfect calculators, but they are capable of making judgements about playing baseball the 
“right way” or the “wrong way”. The economic model below is from chapter 7 of Miceli (2019). 
An assumption of the model is that the economic agents are rational. However, I argue that 
bounded rationality can be used for this model, but the calculations become more imprecise.  
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For this model, x is the action that a team or player uses in order to win, and the action 
could be considered a violation. p(x) is the probability that x results in a team winning a game or 
receiving an advantage over the other team. V is the reward for a team or player if they win the 
game or receive a bonus or award (such as using PEDs to achieve a salary bonus or win Most 
Valuable Player). r(x) is the probability that x results in a violation. r(x) is less than 1, meaning 
that no action is guaranteed to be a violation. q is the probability that the violation will be 
detected. No violation will be perfectly detected. As experienced with PEDs, MLB did not have 
a perfect detection system for players to be caught using the PEDs. Many players have been 
rumored to use PEDs, but MLB did not detect them using PEDs. f is the sanction or fine that is 
imposed on a player for being detected and caught.  Therefore, a team will violate the rule when: 
p(x)V>r(x)qf 
Therefore, if p(x)V>r(x)qf, then the player or team will violate the rule because the benefits of 
victory are greater than the costs of using that action. The penalty does not effectively deter the 
player(s) or team from using that action. 
A team will not violate the rule when: 
p(x)V<r(x)qf 
Therefore, if  p(x)V<r(x)qf, then the player or team will not violate the rule because the benefits 
of victory are less than the costs of using that action. The player or team is effectively deterred 
from using that action.  
B. How MLB Enforces Rule Violations 
MLB has several methods to enforce rules violations: fines, suspensions, loss of draft 
picks, and banishment from the game of baseball. MLB has significant discretion in enforcement 
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and penalties. Both MLB and teams become uncertain about the level of a penalty when the 
violation has never occurred in baseball history. Penalties are known to be adapted and modified 
to become more strict. In the steroids era, MLB had substantial problems with players using 
PEDs despite enforcement. In response, MLB created stricter punishments for when players use 
steroids. It is important to note that players can be punished by MLB, and be punished by the 
criminal justice system. Under the constitution for MLB, a fine cannot exceed $5 million. When 
committing a violation, baseball teams and players must account for $5 million being the upper 
limit on the violation and $0 being the lowest limit on the violation. A fine can also be combined 
with a loss of draft picks, suspensions, and/or a ban from the game of baseball.  
Figure 3 displays three isoquants and the relationship between detection and the different 
levels of fines and sanctions (s). Figure 3 is strictly concerned with actions that relate to 
competitive balance. Harm (h) is not quantifiable, but it is a qualitative value that can be 
separated into an action being low harm, high harm, or severe harm. Low harm would be 
considered actions that cause some damage to the game of baseball, but the actions are not 
significant enough to jeopardize competitive balance in the long term. High harm would be 
considered actions that cause considerable damage to the game of baseball and could jeopardize 
competitive balance. Severe harm would be considered actions that cause considerable damage 
to the game of baseball, but also result in the criminal justice system being involved. Figure 3 
lists examples of actions that would be considered low, high, and severe harm, and the respective 
levels of detection and sanction associated with each action. Figure 3 is a modified version of the 
isoquants that appear in Miceli (2020). Figure 3: 
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V. Houston Astros Use of Illegal Technology in the 2017 Season 
The Houston Astros in the 2017 season used what is considered ​on-field illegal 
technology​ in order to gain an advantage over the team’s opponents. The method that the 
Houston Astros used to steal the catcher’s signs was explained in the background section. Based 
on the discussion in section IV, the Houston Astros were rational in their use of ​on-field illegal 
technology​. The objective of the Houston Astros and every baseball team was to win the World 
Series. However, the preferences of the Houston Astros organization were likely different from 
every other team for that season. The ranked preferences of the Houston Astros in the 2017 
season were likely as follows:  
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(1) win games (ignoring how baseball ought to be played) 
(2) win games based on talent and legal technology 
(3) lose games 
Other baseball teams in 2017 likely had the following preferences: 
(1) Win games based on talent and legal technology 
(2) Lose games 
(3) Win Games (ignoring how baseball ought to be played) 
In the Houston Astros’ pursuit of its objective to win the World Series, the team found the best, 
least cost way to win games and the World Series was through devising a strategy using ​illegal 
technology​. The Houston Astros understood the punishments that MLB could use to punish them 
if the illegal technology was detected: a maximum fine of $5 million, suspensions, loss of draft 
picks, and permanent ban from baseball. The decision-making process behind the Houston 
Astros decision to use the ​illegal technology ​is likely more complicated than simply calling the 
action “rational.” The Houston Astros used bounded rationality in its decision-making process. 
The Houston Astros considered V to be the benefits of winning the World Series and s to 
be the fine for using​ illegal technology​ that could be less than or equal to $5 million plus 
additional non-financial penalties. The Houston Astros were also aware that the probability that 
the action would result in a violation r(x) was low because only the Houston Astros players knew 
about the system, and opposing teams could not easily prove the Astros were stealing signs. The 
use of the technology was certainly a violation, but the probability of detection was very low. 
The only reason that the Houston Astros were caught was because Mike Fiers was a 
whistleblower who had been traded to another team. However, the remaining variables were 
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completely unknown.   The Houston Astros could not have perfectly known the outcomes of 
games and the probability that they would win the World Series using illegal​ technology. ​The 
Houston Astros understood that the ​illegal technology​ would give them a significant advantage 
over the opposing teams. It is extremely difficult to forecast a baseball season that has not yet 
occurred, much less exactly predict the benefits that a technology would give the team. 
The Houston Astros also did not fully know what the non-financial penalties would be if 
detected. In the cost-benefit analysis, the Houston Astros must have projected the fine to be $5 
million. As stated in the introduction, $5 million is equivalent to the salary for the average player 
in MLB. If the Astros knew there was a player that they could sign for $5 million and he would 
give the team a significant advantage, then the team would have signed that player. While they 
understood the fine could be $5 million, the team did not know who would be suspended, if they 
would lose draft picks or if any player or personnel would be banned from the game of baseball. 
The Houston Astros were also likely to be extremely uncertain about the probability of detection. 
The players and personnel did not know if fans or opposing players would be able to hear the 
bangs.  
The reason that the Houston Astros were largely uncertain about the punishment and 
probability of detection was because no team had ever used ​illegal technology​ to steal the 
opposing team’s signs and were caught by MLB. The only other event in MLB history that was 
similar to the Houston Astros use of ​off-field illegal technology​ was the St. Louis Cardinals 
hacking and entering into the ​legal technology​ of the Houston Astros. The St. Louis Cardinals 
were caught and the team was fined $2.5 million, lost draft picks, and the employee leading the 
initiative was sentenced to prison for a felony. The benefits of hacking into the Houston Astros 
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computer system were less than the costs of doing so for the Cardinals organization. The 
decision-making of the St. Louis Cardinals personnel was impacted because there were no 
similar events in baseball history. The personnel likely believed they would receive important 
information about players, and would not be detected. However, they were. As a result, the 
Houston Astros understood there was a possible chance they would be detected. The cost of 
being sent to prison was likely considered too great of a cost to justify the use of illegal 
technology similar to the Cardinals. Instead, the Houston Astros determined a strategy to use 
illegal technology, so that no team personnel would be sent to prison.  
The plan was simple: steal the signs that the opposing teams reveal to the cameras in 
center-field. The unwritten rule of baseball that if a team had a runner on second base was 
extended using technology. The Houston Astros understood that they would be penalized by 
MLB for using ​on-field illegal technology​, but they would not be penalized by the United States 
criminal justice system.  
Currently, the debate over the Houston Astros cheating scandal is based on the 
assumption that the team gained an advantage from its use of illegal technology. However, there 
is no available statistical analysis or data that proves this statement. Instead, there is data that can 
be used to support the statement that Houston Astros were outliers in regular season 
performance, and the team’s use of illegal technology correlated and likely contributed to the 
team’s performance. Table 1 displays the regular-season offensive rankings for a team in the 
year in which they won the World Series. For example, in the 2019 season, the Washington 
Nationals ranked 27th in strikeouts, 6th in batting average, 2nd in On-base percentage, 7th in 
slugging percentage, and 6th in on base plus slugging percentage. In the 2017 season, the 
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Houston Astros ranked 30th in strikeouts, 1st in batting average, 1st in on-base percentage, 1st in 
slugging percentage, and 1st in on base plus slugging percentage. It is not unusual for the team 
that wins the World Series to have exceptional offensive statistics in the regular season as seen 
with the other teams in the table. However, the performance of the Houston Astros is clearly the 
best out of any team between 2009-2019 in terms of rankings. The team that has a comparable 
performance to the 2017 Houston Astros is the 2018 Boston Red Sox (Major League Baseball is 
currently pursuing an investigation for the team’s alleged use of illegal technology). The 
performance of the 2017 Houston Astros is correlated to the team’s use of illegal technology. 
Every team in these rankings had exceptional offensive talent and used legal technology. The 
Astros cheated, which was something different from the rest of these World Series champions, 
and that will always be an asterisk on that team. 
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Table 1: Ranking of Regular-Season Offensive Statistics for World Series Teams  
Yea
r 
World Series 
Champion 
Number 
of 
Strikeouts  
Batting 
Average 
On Base 
Percentage 
Slugging 
Percentage 
On Base 
Plus 
Slugging 
Percentage 
2019 Washington 
Nationals 
27th 6th 2nd 7th 6th 
2018 Boston Red 
Sox 
26th 1st 1st 1st 1st 
2017 Houston Astros 30th 1st 1st 1st 1st 
2016 Chicago Cubs 9th 14th 2nd 10th 3rd 
2015 Kansas City 
Royals 
30th 3rd 11th 11th 10th 
2014 San Francisco 
Giants 
17th 10th 18th 13th 14th 
2013 Boston Red 
Sox 
8th 2nd 1st 1st 1st 
2012 San Francisco 
Giants 
26th 5th 8th 18th 14th 
2011 St. Louis 
Cardinals 
29th 5th 3rd 6th 5th 
2010 San Francisco 
Giants 
19th 15th 19th 13th 17th 
2009 New York 
Yankees 
27th 2nd 1st 1st 1st 
Source: (ESPN, n.d.) 
VI. Illegal Technology and the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The use of illegal technology creates a prisoner’s dilemma for MLB. As explained 
previously, professional sports experienced a prisoner’s dilemma with the use of PEDs. In MLB, 
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PEDs were widely used because of the expected advantages that players would receive from the 
drugs. The use of ​illegal on-field technology​ is likely to become (or already is) a prisoner’s 
dilemma for MLB. When the incentives of winning a baseball game dramatically increase, the 
prisoner’s dilemma with the use of illegal technology is only more likely to occur. The 
assumptions and math used for this prisoner’s dilemma are adapted and modified from “The 
Performance-Enhancing Game” by Kjetil K. Haugan (2004). The prisoner’s dilemma of PEDs 
and the prisoner’s dilemma of illegal technology are similar because both involve strategies that 
can increase the probability of winning and give a team or player an advantage over the 
opponent. 
VI.I The Assumptions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma for Illegal Technology 
The assumptions for the prisoner’s dilemma for illegal technology: 
1. There are two baseball teams who have players of equal talent and equal legal technology 
capabilities. 
2. Each baseball team is capable of choosing between legal and illegal technology as a 
strategy 
a. Illegal technology indicates that the team is using legal technology as well. 
3. The illegal technology provides an advantage if a team uses it. If one team uses illegal 
technology and the other team does not use illegal technology, then the team that uses the 
illegal technology will have a higher probability of winning that game. 
a. For the purposes of this prisoner’s dilemma, the team that does use the illegal 
technology has an 80% chance of winning, and 20% chance of losing. The team 
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that does not use the illegal technology has a 20% chance of winning, and 80% 
chance of losing.  
4. If both teams use the illegal technology, then they will be considered equal competitors 
and have an equal probability of winning. If both teams use the legal technology, then 
they will be considered equal competitors and have an equal probability of winning. 
a. Both teams have a 50% chance of winning and a 50% chance of losing 
5. Both baseball teams must make a choice about whether or not to use illegal technology 
simultaneously prior to the start of a baseball game. (There are costs to setting up the 
illegal technology and coordination between players and front office personnel that must 
occur.) 
6. To make the prisoner’s dilemma simpler, the two teams will play one baseball game. 
Imagine that the baseball game is Game 7 of the World Series. This means that the teams 
have faced off in 6 games previously, and each team has a record of 3 wins and 3 losses 
against the opponent. If a team wins the game, then they win the World Series 
Championship, and receive a large financial bonus (in 2017, the bonus was around $30 
million). If a team loses the game, then they do not receive a championship, but they do 
receive a considerably smaller financial bonus (in 2017, the bonus was around $20 
million) 
7. Each team has the same payoffs that can be obtained: 
W= Team wins the game 
L= Team loses the game 
S= Team is caught for using the illegal technology 
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P= Probability that team wins 
The following payoffs are the utility payoffs and costs associated with winning or losing the 
game: 
U(W)=utility of winning=30  
U(L)=utility of losing=10 
U(S)=sanction for using the illegal technology=-5 
8. The teams must make the choice about whether or not to use illegal technology based on 
the following expected utility payoffs 
a.) Both Teams Use Legal Technology: EU=.5U(W)+.5U(L) 
a. EU=.5(30)+.5(10)=20 
b. Probability of winning=.5 
c. Probability of losing=.5 
B and C.) One team uses illegal technology: EU=.8U(W)+.2U(W)-S 
EU=.8(30)+.2(10)-5=21 
Probability of winning=.8 
Probability of losing=.2 
One team uses legal technology: EU=.8U(L)+.2U(W) 
EU=.8(10)+.2(30)=14 
Probability of losing=.8 
Probability of winning=.2 
d.) Both Teams Use Illegal Technology: EU=.5(W)+.5U(L)-S 
EU=.5(30)+.5(10)-5=14 
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Probability of winning=.5 
Probability of losing=.5 
9. The teams have homogeneous preferences and the payoffs are ranked in the following 
way: 
● One team uses illegal technology, and the other team does not use illegal technology. 
● Both teams use legal technology 
● Both teams use illegal technology 
● The team loses 
10. The team who wins the baseball game will not lose the rewards of winning (bonuses, 
championship title) if the team is caught for use of illegal technology after the game has 
occurred. (The Astros have kept the rewards of winning the 2017 World Series) 
11. If a team uses the illegal technology, then the team will be detected and caught with 
certainty.  
12. Both teams have the catcher signal pitches to the pitcher. This assumption allows a team 
to potentially use the illegal technology that can decipher the signs. 
13. Each team is aware of the rules of MLB and the assumptions. 
VI.II Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Figure 4 displays a matrix with payoffs based off of the above equations for when a team has to 
choose between legal technology and illegal technology. Figure 4: 
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Team 2 
Team 1  
 Legal Technology Illegal Technology 
Legal Technology Teams have an equal 
probability of winning. 
Outcome is uncertain. 
EU=.5U(W)+.5U(L) 
Team 1 will lose. Team 2 will 
win.  
Team 1: EU=.8U(L)+.2U(W) 
Team 
2:EU=.8U(W)+.2U(L)-S 
Illegal Technology Team 1 will win. Team 2 will 
lose 
Team 1: 
EU=.8U(W)+.2U(L)-S 
Team 2: EU=.8U(L)+.2U(W) 
Teams have an equal 
probability of winning. 
Outcome is uncertain, but 
each team will pay a penalty. 
EU=.5(W)+.5U(L)-S 
 
Figure 5 displays a matrix with numbers as payoffs that reflect the financial payoffs of winning 
the World Series. Figure 5: 
Team 2 
Team 1  
 Legal Technology Illegal Technology 
Legal Technology Team 1: 20 
Team 2: 20 
(Each team has a 50/50 
chance of earning either 30 or 
10.) 
Team 1: 14 
Team 2: 21 
(Team 1 will lose and Team 2 
will win, but pay a cost of $5 
because of illegal technology)  
Illegal Technology Team 1: 21 
Team 2: 14 
 (Team 2 will lose and Team 
1 will win, but pay a cost of 
$5 because of illegal 
technology) 
Team 1: 15 
Team 2: 15 
(Each team has a 50/50 
chance of winning either 25 
or 5.)  
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This matrix displays a prisoner’s dilemma because both teams have a dominant strategy to use 
illegal technology and the equilibrium is (Illegal Technology, Illegal Technology). When both 
teams use the illegal technology, they accept a mutually bad outcome that has the lowest payoffs. 
(Illegal Technology, Illegal Technology) is a Nash Equilibrium because both teams use a 
dominant strategy, the equilibrium is mutually bad, and is sub-optimal. The optimal equilibrium 
is (Legal Technology, Legal Technology), but this will not be the outcome because of the 
existence of illegal technology. Each team understands that illegal technology is the dominant 
strategy. Each team prefers the certainty of winning and using illegal technology. If the teams are 
rational, then they will choose the dominant strategy because they know the other team is likely 
to use illegal technology. Even if the opposing team does not use illegal technology, then the 
team will still benefit from the use of illegal technology because they will win. Each team has the 
perverse incentive of using illegal technology because the cost of the penalty is such that 
winning still has more value than losing.  
In order to make this prisoner’s dilemma more realistic, two assumptions must change 
and the teams have heterogeneous preferences. Team 1 ranks their preferences in the following 
way: 
 (1) win games (ignoring how baseball ought to be played) 
(2) win games based on talent and legal technology 
(3) lose games 
Team 2 ranks their preferences in the following way: 
(1) Win games based on talent and legal technology 
(2) Lose games 
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(3) Win Games (ignoring how baseball ought to be played) 
As a result, there is one team that plays baseball the “right way” and the other team plays 
baseball the “wrong way”. Team 1 would be considered pro-cheating and Team 2 would be 
considered anti-cheating. Team 2 is so against cheating, such that any benefits they gained from 
cheating would be cancelled by the team’s displeasure, and the team’s payoff would become the 
cost of cheating. Figure 6 displays the matrix for this scenario. The dominant strategy for team 1 
is to use legal technology and the dominant strategy for team 2 is to use illegal technology. The 
suboptimal equilibrium for this matrix is (Legal Technology, Illegal Technology). In this 
equilibrium, team 1 cheats and receives a benefit from cheating, while team 2 does not cheat. 
Team 1 has only a 20% chance of winning because they used legal technology to play baseball. 
However, Team 2 has a 80% chance of winning because they used illegal technology to play 
baseball. The optimal equilibrium for this matrix is still (legal technology, legal technology). 
Figure 6: 
Team 2 
Team 1 
 Legal Technology Illegal Technology 
Legal Technology Team 1: 20 
Team 2: 20 
(Each team has a 50/50 
chance of earning either 30 or 
10.) 
Team 1: 14 
Team 2: 21 
(Team 1 would likely lose 
and Team 2 would likely win, 
but pay a cost of $5 because 
of illegal technology)  
Illegal Technology Team 1: -5 
Team 2: 14 
 (Team 2 would likely lose 
and Team 1 would likely win, 
but pay a cost of $5 because 
of illegal technology) 
Team 1: -5 
Team 2: 15 
(Each team has a 50/50 
chance of winning, but Team 
1 would receive -5, and Team 
2 would receive 15) 
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The equilibrium explained in the previous paragraph and figure has real world 
implications in MLB. In the 2017 World Series, the Houston Astros played the Los Angeles 
Dodgers. At this time, it cannot be said that the Houston Astros used illegal technology in the 
World Series, but they did use the illegal technology in many regular-season and postseason 
games that season. Players on the Los Angeles Dodgers believed that the Houston Astros did use 
illegal technology during the World Series. The Los Angeles Dodgers players have also voiced 
their unhappiness about the Astros actions. The Los Angeles Dodgers likely did not establish 
their own illegal technology scheme because of their moral beliefs about how baseball ought to 
be played. If that was the case, then figure 6 would have predicted the outcome. With the 
Houston Astros using illegal technology, the game was no longer based on talent and legal 
technology, but was based on the use of illegal technology and technology. Out of every baseball 
game in the 2017 season, game 7 of the World Series had the largest incentives for the winning 
team. 
This prisoner’s dilemma can be extended to every regular-season game.  It is extremely 
difficult for a team to reach the postseason and the World Series. The Houston Astros were 
willing to use illegal technology for multiple games in the season in order to reach the 
postseason. In the 2017 season, other teams were uncertain about whether or not the Astros were 
using illegal technology. Other teams in the MLB had to make a choice about whether or not 
they should use illegal technology, and many chose not to because they were uncertain about the 
strategies of their opponents. It was not until after the 2019 season that it was formally 
determined that the Houston Astros had used illegal technology. After the 2018 season, the 
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Boston Red Sox have been accused of developing an ​illegal on-field technology​ method to 
communicate. In future seasons, the likelihood that other teams will adopt illegal technology 
schemes is only more likely because there is knowledge of two teams choosing that strategy. The 
value of winning the World Series is so great, and the deterrents are so weak, such that teams are 
willing to use illegal technology in order to improve their chances. 
Cooperation is often stated to be the solution to overcoming the prisoner’s dilemma. 
Baseball teams currently attempt to cooperate through MLB. In order for the teams to be able to 
escape the prisoner’s dilemma, then teams must accept policy changes. MLB did not intend to 
make the teams be part of a prisoner’s dilemma, but that is the effect of capping penalties. One 
solution is for MLB to remove the limit on penalties, and allow penalties to be greater than 
$5,000,000. MLB could then effectively match the penalty to the behavior. MLB must fine teams 
in such a way that the fine is able to effectively deter behavior that is harmful to competitive 
balance and uncertainty of outcome. For example, the fine for using illegal technology could 
drastically increase above $5,000,000 for game 7 of the World Series when the payoffs are the 
highest. The fine or penalty could be increased such that the value of losing is greater than the 
value of winning if a team were to use illegal technology.  
However, this may not be an effective deterrent because individual players might be able 
to use illegal technology that the team does not know about. If this is the case, then MLB may 
struggle to deter these players because the illegal technology could improve the performance of 
players that is then rewarded on the labor market. Additionally, teams may not want to accept 
this policy change because there is uncertainty about how that fine might impact teams in the 
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future. The uncertainty causes teams to reject a policy that would otherwise lead to a pareto 
optimum equilibrium.  
VII. Irrationality, Status Quo Bias, Nudge, and Changing Baseball 
The defense of teams has become irrational due to the team’s knowledge that other teams 
were likely stealing signs using illegal technology, but the defense did not change its behavior. 
The defense has an objective to prevent the offense of the other team from scoring runs. The 
offense of a baseball team has an objective to score runs. The defense will logically use various 
strategies and take actions that prevent the offense from scoring runs. If the offense knows what 
pitches will be thrown, then that is harmful to the objective of the defense. As discussed 
previously, asymmetric information is important for the game of baseball because only the 
defense is supposed to know what pitch will be thrown. As a result, the preferences of the 
defense are as follows: (1) indicate signs to the pitcher without the opposing team knowing or (2) 
indicate signs to the pitcher with the opposing team knowing.  
The defense of baseball teams are acting irrationally because they are not choosing the 
preference that they prefer the most. The existence of illegal technology has allowed the offense 
to decipher the catcher’s signs. The defense on every team is aware of the benefits and use of 
illegal technology by the opposing team. However, baseball teams have not changed the strategy 
of how pitches are called by the catcher. Baseball teams have created complicated signs to signal 
to the pitcher, but the technology is likely able to decipher the signs. In the 2019 World Series, 
the Washington Nationals suspected that the Houston Astros were stealing signs, so they 
responded by creating complicated signs to beat the technology. However, baseball teams are 
limited by the human capabilities of the defense. The signs that catchers use can be broken down 
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into patterns that are analyzed by the technology. Regardless of how complicated the signs are, 
the technology has a high likelihood of being able to determine what pitches will be thrown.  
An explanation for why the defense of baseball teams and the MLB have not avidly 
pursued a change in how pitches are called is because of the status quo bias. Catchers signaling 
to the pitcher is considered the default and most time-efficient option for defenses to use. 
Baseball has always been played in this way, and there has never been a reason to alter this 
method unless there was a runner on second base. Innovations and the use of illegal technology 
have allowed the offense to manipulate the default option for the offense’s benefit. MLB and 
baseball teams understand this manipulation is occurring, but the teams are experiencing inertia, 
in which the organizations are unwilling to change because of the traditions of the sport. MLB 
and teams understand that baseball has always been played this way, so it must not change from 
this “status quo”. The unwillingness to change how pitches are called has further forced teams to 
accept a sub-optimal position in the MLB. If the defense does not change how they call pitches, 
then offenses will continue to develop technology or methods to steal signs.  
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein argued that people could be “nudged” away from the 
default option, which would otherwise be an irrational choice, to a better option, which would be 
considered rational. Could MLB, acting as a choice architect, attempt to nudge teams to act 
rationally and not use illegal technology? The answer is yes, but there is uncertainty about 
whether or not the nudges would actually be able to change behavior of teams and players. The 
discussion for the remainder of this section is speculative and the exact impacts of the changes 
are unknown. 
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MLB could adopt aspects of the philosophy and approaches of libertarian paternalism. 
MLB is already a mix of libertarianism and paternalism. The fines and suspensions are 
punishments that the MLB is capable of making because of its paternalistic structure. The labor 
market in MLB and the choices that teams make regarding players is fully at the discretion of the 
team and part of the libertarian structure. So how would libertarian paternalism apply to 
baseball? The answer is that MLB can encourage the defense to use electronic equipment when 
calling pitches, but not mandate that method. I am doubtful of the ability of defenses to create 
complicated signs that can outsmart the illegal technology. If the pitcher, catcher, and coach 
could communicate through headsets, then they would be able to choose which pitch to throw 
and the offense would not be aware of the pitch. Headsets would remove the ability of the 
offense to use illegal technology that can decipher signs. MLB has been resistant to use headsets 
because of the status quo bias that was described previously. The belief that baseball should be 
played as it always has been, and introducing headsets would ruin baseball is very strong. 
However, the use of illegal technology is a much larger threat to the competitive nature of 
baseball. Headsets would likely move baseball towards a state of competitive balance because 
each team could adopt this “legal technology” that would prevent any chance that the other team 
could steal signs. Joe Girardi and others have advocated for the use of headsets in baseball.  
In order to encourage baseball teams to not use illegal technology, Major League 
Baseball should improve the league’s whistleblower system. Pitcher Mike Fiers was the 
whistleblower who informed the media about the actions of the Houston Astros in 2017. Mike 
Fiers has been criticized in sports media and he has also received death threats for being a 
whistleblower. Arguably, death threats are enough of a deterrent to prevent people from speaking 
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the truth. In future seasons, when a player discovers egregious behavior on a team, should that 
player be a whistleblower after the treatment of Mike Fiers? This is a question that MLB needs 
to grapple with in future feasons. MLB should improve the whistleblower system to protect the 
identity of the individual and prevent the whistleblower from being forced to go public. If a 
player is able to receive protection of their identity, then they are more likely to inform the MLB 
when a team is behaving egregiously. By protecting the whistleblower, MLB is “nudging” teams 
to not cheat.  MLB needs to expect teams to make errors, in the sense that teams will cheat in 
order to win. MLB needs to institute a mechanism that can effectively catch these “errors” before 
they might happen. The whistleblower would be equivalent to the light on a car that informs the 
driver they need to fill their gas tank. Teams would then assume that at least one of its players 
would be a whistleblower. If teams understood there was a higher probability that they would be 
caught for their actions in the immediate future, then they would not cheat or use illegal 
technology. The idea that at least one of the players could be a whistleblower could “nudge” 
teams to choose a Pareto optimal strategy to attempt to win solely on the basis of talent and legal 
technology. 
MLB teams need more “feedback” about the extent of Houston Astros sign-stealing 
methods and the advantages and benefits that the team received. More “feedback” could lead to 
the defense of teams improving their methods of signaling pitches or changing to technology. In 
the Commissioner’s Report, the claim that the Astros devised a system to steal signs was 
verified. However, the report left several questions unanswered. In how many games did the 
Astros steal signs? In which games did the stealing signs lead to more runs, home runs, and hits? 
Was stealing signs even effective? Currently, the publicly available data on the extent of the 
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Houston Astros sign-stealing methods is incomplete. A baseball fan created a system that 
detected when the Astros banged before a pitch in 60 of the team’s home games. The results 
were that the Astros used the system consistently throughout the season. However, there is no 
data for the remaining 102 games. MLB is capable of discovering the extent to which the Astros 
stole signs.  A more in-depth report regarding the data of Astros sign-stealing would  “nudge” 
teams to take more precautions in communicating signs. Support for the use of headsets would 
likely increase as a measure to protect signs from being stolen. The defense of teams would then 
act rationally and choose to find a method to indicate signs to the pitcher without the opposing 
team knowing what pitch would be thrown.  
Areas for Further Discussion and Challenges 
This paper is written on the belief that the Houston Astros gained an advantage from the 
use of ​illegal on-field technology. ​It is unclear whether there was an advantage because there is 
incomplete data on the 2017 season. Additionally, the prisoner’s dilemma that baseball will 
encounter with illegal technology assumes that both teams have an equal probability of winning 
without illegal technology. It is exceptionally rare to have two teams that have an equal 
probability of winning. This assumption allows the argument to be built that baseball is in a 
prisoner’s dilemma. The use of this unrealistic assumption does not mean that the use of illegal 
technology is not a prisoner’s dilemma. Instead, it just makes the scenario more easy to explain. 
If there was a competitive imbalance between the teams, then the weaker team would use illegal 
technology to be balanced with the better team, and the better team would gain a more 
significant advantage over the weaker team. Additionally, the economic models of baseball in 
the 20th century and 21st century are difficult to actually study. It is unknown the exact benefits 
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that a team gains from the use of technology. It is also unknown exactly how to measure talent of 
a baseball team. Additionally, a psychological analysis of the Houston Astros in the 2017 season 
would be beneficial to this paper. It is evident that the Astros were overconfident in their ability 
to be detected. Heuristics likely impacted the decision-making of the Astros.  
Conclusion 
The analysis of the differences between MLB in the 20th century and 21st century 
revealed the impact that technology has had on the game of baseball. In the 21st century, front 
offices use technology in order to obtain information that better informs the players about their 
strengths and weaknesses, and those of their opponents. Baseball players and the front office 
staff have become interdependent in order to win baseball games. Within MLB, there is a 
distinction between legal technology and illegal technology. All baseball teams currently adopt 
the use of legal technology. However, the use of illegal technology by baseball teams is linked to 
the existence of a prisoner’s dilemma in MLB. Illegal technology is believed to give an 
advantage to one team over the other. However, if both teams use illegal technology, then the 
benefits are nullified. There are two potential prisoner’s dilemmas in MLB. The first prisoner’s 
dilemma involves both teams having a dominant strategy to use illegal technology. This results 
in a Nash sub-optimal equilibrium, whereby both teams use illegal technology and they both 
accept mutually bad outcomes. The second prisoner’s dilemma involves one team having a 
dominant strategy to use illegal technology and one team having a dominant strategy to only use 
legal technology. In this prisoner’s dilemma, a suboptimal equilibrium occurs, whereby the team 
that uses the illegal technology has a clear benefit and is more likely to win, while the team that 
uses the legal technology experiences a disadvantage and is less likely to win.  
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After the actions of the Houston Astros in the 2017 season and the subsequent 
investigation and penalties, it can be argued that the current penalties are not an adequate 
deterrent for the use of illegal technology. MLB must determine and configure a better system to 
discourage the use of illegal technology. This paper provided some policy solutions, such as 
improved data on the benefits that the Astros received from the technology, a more protective 
whistleblower system, and the use of headsets by the catcher, pitcher, and coach that MLB could 
implement. If MLB does not correct the behavior of teams, then competitive balance and the 
uncertainty of outcomes for baseball games is in jeopardy.  
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Appendix:  
Regular-season team offense statistics were found on the website of ESPN.  
Here are website links for the seasons of 2009-2019: 
2019: ​http://www.espn.com/mlb/stats/team/_/stat/batting 
2018: ​http://www.espn.com/mlb/stats/team/_/stat/batting/year/2018 
2017: ​http://www.espn.com/mlb/stats/team/_/stat/batting/year/2017 
2016: ​http://www.espn.com/mlb/stats/team/_/stat/batting/year/2016 
2015: ​http://www.espn.com/mlb/stats/team/_/stat/batting/year/2015 
2014: ​http://www.espn.com/mlb/stats/team/_/stat/batting/year/2014 
2013: ​http://www.espn.com/mlb/stats/team/_/stat/batting/year/2013 
2012: ​http://www.espn.com/mlb/stats/team/_/stat/batting/year/2012 
2011: ​http://www.espn.com/mlb/stats/team/_/stat/batting/year/2011 
2010: ​http://www.espn.com/mlb/stats/team/_/stat/batting/year/2010 
2009: ​http://www.espn.com/mlb/stats/team/_/stat/batting/year/2009 
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